Social interactions are at the essence of societies and explain the gathering of individuals in villages, agglomerations, or cities. We study the emergence of multiple agglomerations as resulting from the interplay between spatial interaction externalities and competition in the land market. We show that the geographical nature of the residential space tremendously affects the properties of spatial equilibria. In particular, when agents locate on an open land strip (line segment), a single city emerges in equilibrium. In contrast, when the spatial economy extends along a closed land strip (circumference), multiple equilibria with odd numbers of cities arise. Spatial equilibrium configurations involve a high degree of spatial symmetry in terms of city size and location, and can be Pareto-ranked.
Introduction
A major source of spatial heterogeneity stems from non-market interactions. Social interactions through face-to-face contacts are at the essence of our societies and explain the gathering of individuals in villages, agglomerations, or cities. They translate a psychological need for maintaining relationships with one another, and favor a constant exchange of ideas; see Krugman (1991) , Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003) , and Fujita and Thisse (2002) . In this paper we address the issue of the emergence of multiple agglomerations as the result of the interplay between social interactions and competition in the land market.
The present paper builds on Beckmann's (1976) model. This model provides a simple rationale for the spatial agglomeration of agents as the result of spatial interaction externalities. Agents are distributed along some geographical space and bene…t from social interactions with other agents. These social interactions provide individuals with a social interaction bene…t while entailing an individual cost as each one must access to distant agents. Moreover the return of spatial interactions is also balanced by a cost of residence as agents compete for land space. When the bene…t of social interactions is larger than the commuting and residence costs, agents prefer to locate close to each other, which leads to the formation of agglomerations. In his original work, Beckmann considered the case of a one-dimensional spatial economy extending along an open land strip (line segment). The resulting equilibrium consists in a uni-modal symmetric -bellshaped -spatial distribution, where agents agglomerate around the city centre, see Fujita and Thisse (2002) .
In this paper, …rst we revisit Beckmann (1976) 's model and then extend it to the case of a spatial economy extending along a closed land strip (circumference). While the modelling along an open land strip seems appropriate to describe the internal structure of cities, the formulation along a closed land strip provides a natural framework to analyze the interaction between multiple agglomerations. Circular spatial frameworks have been studied in 'racetrack economy' models in the context of the New Economic Geography literature, see e.g. Fujita et al. (1999) , Mossay (2003) , or Picard and Tabuchi (2009) . Yet, because of the complexity of market interactions, this strand of literature has been able to characterize only a small subset of equilibrium distributions (e.g. the uniform spatial distribution of agents, often referred to as the ' ‡at-earth'distribution, or constant-access equilibria). As a consequence, this strand of literature has left unresolved issues dealing with the nature and structure of other equilibrium distributions. Among these issues, are the multiplicity of those other equilibria, their possible spatial symmetry, and the allocation of land between inhabited areas and empty hinterlands. Because our social interaction model has a much simpler structure than that involved in market interaction models, we are able to address the above issues and characterize spatial equilibria.
Our results are the following. First we determine the equilibrium and …rst-best spatial distributions of agents along an open land strip. Social interactions generate the emergence of a single city, meaning that multiple cities can't be sustained in equilibrium along a line. This result is similar to that obtained by Berliant et al. (2002) who also showed the emergence of a unique centre in the case of production externalities. In accordance to Fujita and Thisse (2002) , the …rst-best distribution is more concentrated than the equilibrium one; see also Tabuchi (1986) . At equilibrium agents choose a too large lot size because they do not internalize other agents'preferences when making their own lot choice. Second we provide the characterization of spatial equilibria emerging along a closed land strip (circular geographical space). In equilibrium, cities are identical and evenly spaced: cities share the same spatial structure and successive …rms along the circumference are equidistant. We also show that equilibrium con…gurations involve an odd number of cities. Furthermore spatial equilibria can be Pareto-ranked. The total welfare of the spatial economy decreases with the number of cities so that the one-city con…guration Pareto dominates all the other con…gurations. Like in the open land strip framework, the …rst-best distribution corresponds to a single city structure which is more concentrated than the equilibrium distribution.
Our paper deals with the endogenous formation of multiple-centre con…gurations. A contribution of Berliant et al. (2002) is that the nature of spatial externalities matters and a¤ects the properties of spatial equilibria. In Ogawa (1980, 1982) , multiplicity of equilibria arises because of a …xed factor in the production process. In contrast, the spatial production externalities analyzed by Berliant et al. (2002) lead to the formation of a single centre in equilibrium. Our paper identi…es another factor a¤ecting the properties of spatial equilibria, namely the nature of the geographical space itself. Our results suggest that loops within a network favour the emergence of multiple cities as opposed to the unique centre emerging along a line segment. To our knowledge, this paper constitutes the very …rst step toward the characterization of interacting economies extending along spatial (road) networks that involve a loop. In constrast to Ogawa (1980, 1982) and Berliant et al. (2002) , our model is analytically tractable because of the linear structure of the model. For that reason we are able to perform a full general equilibrium analysis, without assuming inelastic land consumption or relying on simulations.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on city structure in a particular way.
Since von Thunen, most theoretical works about city structures make the assumption of revolution symmetry around the city centre in order to reduce the spatial dimension from 2 to 1. Recent works on endogenous city formation still make that convenient assumption (e.g. Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002). As such, it is important to check whether revolution symmetry can be derived as an equilibrium property of a spatial economy where agents can locate freely. Since revolution symmetry does not obtain in our model, our paper sheds some doubt on the use of the revolution symmetry assumption made in the existing literature.
We present the model of social interactions in Section 2. We derive the equilibrium and the …rst-best spatial distributions of the model along an open line in Section 3. Section 4 characterizes spatial equilibria along a circumference. Section 5 ranks these various equilibria and compares them with the socially optimal distribution.
The Model
In this Section we present the economic environment. A unit-mass of agents is distributed along a one-dimensional geographical space according to the density (x) with R (x)dx = 1. Agents travel along the one-dimensional road and bene…t from social contacts with other agents. The social utility that an agent in location x derives from interacting with other agents is given by
The …rst term A denotes the total return from interacting with other agents. The second term re ‡ects the cost of trips of accessing to distant agents. 1 We consider the case of a linear cost function T (x y) = 2 jx yj, where measures the intensity of travelling costs. In our model each agent interacts with all the other agents meaning that A will be assumed to be large enough to ensure that S(x) 0, for any location x. The surplus S(x)
can be interpreted in a context of certainty or uncertainty. Indeed, it can be interpreted literally as the utility derived by an individual who plans to interact with all other agents with probability 1. It can also be interpreted as the expected utility of an individual who plans to interact with a subset of agents whom location and identity are not known at the time of the residence choice. Such an interpretation applied to the case of shopkeepers, sellers, as well as workers who expect to hold several jobs at di¤erent locations during their lifetime, or employers who do not have a precise idea about future workers'residences.
In each location x, the residential area is longitudinal to the main road. It is a strip of land space with unit width, which is connected by its edge to the main road. Agents in location x consume a composite good z(x) and some land space s(x). Their utility U is given by
1 Note that the term ( R (y)T (x y)dy) could be formulated as a monetary cost. Anyway such a reformulation would have no incidence on our analysis.
where S(x) is the social utility as given by relation (1) and re ‡ects the preference for land. The budget constraint faced by agents is
where Y is the income and R(x) denotes the land rent in x.
2 By using this budget constraint, the utility derived in location x can be rewritten as
This formulation of the utility function di¤ers from Beckmann's formulation in one respect only: we consider an hyperbolic preference for land instead of the logarithmic preference used in Beckmann (1976) and Fujita and Thisse (2002) . This will allow us to simplify considerably the characterization of equilibria.
Landlords raise the land rent until no worker moves. Let U be an equilibrium utility of workers. The bid rent function is given by
which yields the optimal land consumption s (x) as determined by =[2s
At the residential equilibrium, land rents are equal to the bid rents so that R (x) = (x), which implies that s R (x) = =(2s (x)). The indirect utility can then be written as U (x) = S (x) =s (x) + Y . Since the land strip has a unit width, the individual land consumption s (x) corresponds to 1= (x), so that the indirect utility in location x can be written in terms of the population density (x) as
This means that the residents' utility at location x linearly increases with the social return S(x) and linearly decreases with the residential density (x). Utility decreases with the residential density because agents compete for land space and thus face higher land prices in more populated areas. We will take advantage of this linear structure to characterize spatial equilibria and the optimal spatial distribution. The characterization of these spatial con…gurations constitutes the major contribution of our paper to the existing literature. In what follows we assume without much loss of generality that land has no other use than residence so that the opportunity cost of land is zero.
Spatial Equilibrium along a Line Segment
In this Section we formulate our social interaction model along a line segment as studied in Beckmann (1976) and Fujita and Thisse (2002, Chapter 6). (1) with respect to x, we have that
Spatial Equilibrium
Because of linear travel costs, S 00 (x) reduces to a linear function of . Hence, by using relation (3), a necessary condition for equilibrium is V 00 (x) = S 00 (x) 00 (x) = 0, which leads to
The solution to this di¤erential equation is given by
where C and x o are constants to be determined. We can assume that the city is centered at
the equilibrium spatial structure and the boundary of the city are given by
This describes the spatial structure of a single city. The density is a concave function of
x. We must also ensure that each agent is willing to interact with all the other agents so
. Note that the equilibrium utility level is given by (4) holds (1) and (3), we get
We show that some residents living in city M have an incentive to relocate. By di¤eren-tiating previous expression, we get
When a resident relocates to his right, he looses access to the residents to his left, who live either in other cities (…rst term) or in his own city (second term). He also gains a better access to the residents to his right within his own city (third term). Finally, this resident faces an increase in land rent if x 2 [a M ; x M ] or a decrease in this land rent if
In particular, at the centre of city M ,
where L M denotes the population in city M . Therefore, residents living at the centre of city M have always an incentive to move leftward, and no spatial con…guration with M 2 cities can't be sustained in equilibrium.
We summarize our results in the following Proposition.
, the spatial equilibrium along a line segment is unique and involves a single unimodal city. The equilibrium utility level decreases with the travel cost ( ) and the preference for residential space ( ).
The spatial equilibrium distribution is symmetric with respect to location x = 0 and concave. This distribution is similar to that obtained by Beckmann except that here the city structure is nowhere convex because of our hyperbolic preference for residential space and the zero opportunity cost of land.
Also the spatial equilibrium distribution involves a unique centre. This result is similar to that obtained by Berliant et al. (2002) in the case of spatial knowledge spillovers.
First-Best Spatial Distribution
In this subsection we determine the …rst-best distribution of agents as opposed to the equilibrium distribution analyzed so far. A utilitarian planner chooses the best spatial distribution of agents (:) and the city border b so as to maximize the total welfare denoted by W . In the …rst best, the planner chooses the residents'locations so that there is no land market: R(x) = 0. The planner's program is therefore
subject to the budget balance 
By using varational analysis, we show in Appendix A that the …rst-best distribution satis…es the following relationships
where > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the total population constraint.
This characterization yields two conclusions. First, it should be that (b) = ( b) = 0 since (x) 0. Second, the function S(x) ( =2) (x) is constant so that its …rst and second derivatives should be nil. Note that this function is similar to the expression of the indirect utility derived in the decentralized equilibrium analysis, see expression (3), except that is to be replaced by =2. Therefore, it should be that at the optimum
with the city border
given the total population constraint.
Hence we oberve that the optimal city has a narrower support than the decentralized city, b o < b . Because the …rst-best and the equilibrium cities host the same number of residents, the density of residents must be larger at the …rst-best, C o > C .
Proposition 2 The …rst-best spatial distribution is unimodal and the optimal city is more concentrated than the equilibrium city.
In accordance to Fujita and Thisse (2002) , the …rst-best distribution is more concentrated than the equilibrium one; see also Tabuchi (1986) . At equilibrium agents choose a too large lot size because they do not internalize other agents'preferences when making their own lot choice.
Spatial Equilibrium along a Circumference
In this Section we consider the robustness of previous results with respect to another form of geographical space. In particular we want to check whether spatial interactions along a line which is closed, such as a circumference, lead to the formation of a single city or to the emergence of multiple centres. The equilibrium characterization is more di¢ cult to obtain along such a geographical space. For the sake of comparison with the equilibrium on a line segment, we therefore focus on the formation of unimodal cities and show that spatial equilibria can involve multiple cities. A major contribution of this paper is to provide the characterization of such multiple agglomerations in equilibrium.
To obtain our results, we proceed in several steps. Like in previous Section, we …rst derive a necessary equilibrium condition (Lemma 1). This condition expresses the trade-o¤ between the residence cost and the accessing cost to other agents. We then derive another necessary equilibrium condition (Lemma 2) which simply states that an equilibrium distribution is of made of pieces, each of which having the shape of the cosine function as obtained along the line segment in Section 3. We show that in equilibrium antipodal cities can't exist (i.e. cities can't face each other along the circumference) (Lemma 3). This subsequently implies that no equilibrium with an even number of cities can exist (Lemma Consider some agent located in city m so that x 2 [a m ; b m ]. We de…ne P + (x) (resp.
P (x)) as the population that is located at a clockwise (resp. counterclockwise) distance from x smaller than 1=2. This means that P + (x) and P (x) divide the total population into that at the right and that at the left of x. A …rst order di¤erentiation of the indirect utitity V (x) yields the following lemma.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
This condition expresses the trade-o¤ between the residence cost and the accessing cost: in equilibrium an increase in residence cost must be compensated by a better access to distant agents. 3 So as to illustrate Lemma 1, suppose that 0 (x) < 0, so that an agent located at x enjoys a lower residence cost by moving clockwise. Lemma 1 says that this gain in terms of residence cost should be balanced by a larger accessing cost. This means that the population that the agent gets closer to (i.e. the population at his right, P + ) should be less numerous that the population he gets further away from (i.e. the population at his left P ). The marginal residential cost of moving to the right or to the left corresponds to the marginal gain of accessing to other agents.
Because agents may access to other agents by travelling to the right or to the left, they will be sensitive to the fact that other agents may be located in the opposite location along the circumference. For this reason, it is useful to rely on the concept of antipodal cities 
Given that P + (x) = P (x + 1=2) and P (x) = P + (x + 1=2), the RHS of the above relation is equal to 0, which leads to an inconsistency given that in our example, 0 (x) = 0 (x + 1=2) 6 = 0 if x 6 = 0. The above condition actually implies that if 0 (x) > 0 then 0 (x + 1=2) < 0: if equilibrium land rents increase in location x, they should necessarily decrease in location x + 1=2. As a consequence, if 0 ( b) > 0, then 0 (1=2 b) should be negative which would imply some negative population levels. This situation is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 1 .
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE.
The following Lemma generalizes the argument made above and rules out any spatial distribution involving antipodal cities in equilibrium.
Lemma 3 There exists no spatial equilibrium with antipodal cities, except the uniform distribution.
A …rst implication of Lemma 3 is that, except the uniform equilibrium, any spatial equilibrium distribution involves empty hinterlands. Such spatial equilibria result from the natural tension between the supply and the residents' self-organized use of space.
Indeed, in equilibrium, when residents in a particular city have no arbitrage opportunity, the population density follows the law given in Lemma 2. This law determines not only the use of space in each city but also the city support (i.e. A second implication of Lemma 3 lies in the impossibility to get equilibria with an even number of cities. As an illustration, let us explain the argument for a con…guration that would involve an even number of identical cities. By Lemma 3, we know that these cities can't be antipodal. Suppose that cities are located at asymmetric distances. The case of 2 such cities is depicted in the right panel of Figure 1 . By applying Lemma 1 at the centre x m of a city, we get that P + (x m ) = P (x m ) because the land rent gradient is nil at the city centre ( 0 (x m ) = 0). This means that the populations at the right and at the left of the city centre x m should be equal, which is inconsistent with our example since one side of the city will involve an even number of cities while the other side will involve an odd number of cities, given that the total number of cities is even. In this example, the argument applies because cities are of equal size. The following Lemma extends the argument to the case of spatial distributions involving cities of di¤erent size.
Lemma 4 Any non-uniform spatial equilibrium displays an odd number of cities.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
What is now left to be determined is the size of cities and their location along the circumference. In Appendix B:4, we apply an argument used in Lemma 4 to pairs of cities located on the circumference. Then we show that such pairs of cities have an identical population size in equilibrium. By inference, all cities must have the same size.
Furthermore, once cities have an identical size, it is easy to understand why they should be evemly spaced along the circumference. This is because any asymmetry in the location of these cities would necessarily confer an advantage to residents of some city and a disavantage to residents of some other city, thus precluding equilibrium. We summarize our results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3
The set of spatial equilibria consists of the uniform distribution (the ' ‡at earth'distribution) as well as any odd number of identical and evenly spaced non-antipodal cities, each of which having an internal structure as given by Lemma
2.
Proof. See Appendix B.4. In equilibrium, the support of cities should …t the unit perimeter of the circumference (2M = < 1), so that the maximum number of cities is given by M max =int( = (2 )). On the other hand, since the total population is 1, we have that M R 
Pareto-Ranking of Equilibria and Optimum
In this Section we rank the spatial equilibria obtained in Section 4 in the sense of Pareto.
Then we compare the Pareto dominating equilibrium with the …rst-best distribution.
Consider a spatial equilibrium with an odd number M of identical evenly spaced nonantipodal cities as given by Proposition 3. With no loss of generality, we assume that the …rst city is centered at x = 0. In equilibrium the utility is the same for all residents and corresponds to the utility of residents located at x = 0, which is given by
where a m corresponds to the left-border of city m. Developments given in Appendix C:1 lead to
The …rst term represents the bene…t of social interactions, the second one the agent's travel cost to other agents in their own city, the third one the travel cost to agents living in other cities, and the next to last one the land rent. It can be shown that V (M ) is a decreasing function in the admissible interval [1; =(2 )]. Therefore spatial equilibria can be ranked as sumarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4
The smaller the number of cities, the larger the total welfare of the equilibrium distribution. If > 2 (resp. < 2 ), then the Pareto-dominating spatial equilibrium con…guration corresponds to a single city distribution (resp. the uniform distribution).
Proof. Appendix C.2
Of course, when no city as given by Lemma 2 can …t the unit perimeter of the circumference, the only possible equilibrium is the uniform distribution (x) = 1. Now we determine the …rst-best distribution of residents along the circumference.
Proposition 5 When > (resp. < ), the optimal spatial con…guration corresponds to a single city distribution with welfare A p =(2 p 2) + Y (resp. the uniform spatial distribution of agents with welfare A =2 + Y ).
Proof. Appendix C.3
Like in Beckmann's framework in Section 3:2, the social optimum involves a single city which is more concentrated than the equilibrium distribution. Of course, this occurs provided that the optimal city can …t the unit perimeter. Otherwise, the …rst-best distribution corresponds to the uniform distribution of agents. While an increase of the travel cost ( ) favours the optimal agglomeration, an increase of the preference for residential space ( ) favours the optimal uniform distribution of residents.
Conclusion
We have studied a spatial model of social interactions. We have shown that only a single city can emerge along a line segment. On the other hand, along a circumference, multiple equilibria can emerge. We have shown that in equilibrium, cities are identical, in odd numbers, and evenly spaced along the circumference. The smaller the number of cities, the larger the total welfare of the spatial economy. The …rst-best distribution corresponds to a single city which is more concentrated than the equilibrium city. Our paper constitutes a very …rst analysis toward the characterization of spatial equilibria along spatial (road) networks that include loops. It identi…es the geographical space itself as a very important factor a¤ecting the properties of spatial equilibria (multiplicity, size, spacing). Proof. The Lagrange functional L of problem (7) can be written as
where is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the total population constraint and we used (x) = 1=s(x).
First, we determine a …rst-order condition with respect to the city border b. By di¤erentiating the above expression with respect to b, we get
Second, we determine the …rst-order condition with respect to the spatial distribution . By using Relation (1), the Lagrange functional can be rewritten as
Now consider some in…nitesimally small variation e (x) around the optimal solution (x).
The variation of L is given by
T (x y) (y) e (x)dxdy by using the symmetry of T (x). At the optimum, e L must be equal to zero for any admissible variation e (x) around the optimal distribution (x): This implies
Therefore the function S(x) ( =2) (x) is a constant. Finally, by substituting this last expression evaluated in x = b and x = b into expression (9), we get 
where supp denotes a characteristic function so that supp (x) is equal 1, if x 2supp , and 0 otherwise. By di¤erentiation with respect to x, we get
We get the stated result by writing 
By further di¤erentiation with respect to x, we get Proof. By applying Lemma 1 at the centre x m of each city m, we get P + (x m ) P (x m ) = 0, m = 1; 2; :::; M . These conditions can be written in the following matrix form 2 where a ij 2 f 1; +1g indicates whether j 2 I i (city j is a right-neighbor of city i) or
(city j is a left-neighbor of city i). We refer to matrix A as the 'neighborhood' matrix.
It turns out that the determinant of a matrix can be expressed as det A = P 2 "( )
where is a permutation of f1; 2; :::; M g, the set of derangements of f1; 2; :::; M g, and " : ! f 1; 1g. Given that the number of such derangements is odd when M is even and a ij 2 f 1; 1g for j 6 = i, det A corresponds to a sum of an odd number of terms equal to 1 or +1. Given this, whenever M is even, det A is non-zero and the only solution to the linear system A P = 0, is P = 0. Note that when M is odd, det A = 0 because
Appendix B.4: Proof of Proposition 3
As is the case in racetrack models of spatial agglomeration, the uniform distribution is a trivial equilibrium. The point of our analysis is to focus on the characterization of other equilibria.
First we prove that cities such as given by Lemma 2 should be equally populated and that they should be evenly spaced along the circumference. Let M be an odd number of cities that are clockwisely indexed. Let P m be the population of city m and #I + m (resp. #I m ) be the number of cities that are located on the right (resp. left) of city m. We de…ne the following symmetry concept in the location of cities. We also de…ne pairs of cities located on the circumference as follows.
De…nition (Paired Cities) Consider the centre x m of some city m and its symmetric location x m+1=2
x m + 1=2. From that location, move clockwise (resp. counterclockwise) to the next …rst city, say city j with centre x j . Then consider the symmetric location of that centre x j , x j+1=2 x j + 1=2. Cities m and j are said to be clockwisely paired (resp. counterclockwisely paired) if there is no other city in the interval (x m ; x j+1=2 ) (resp. (x j+1=2 ; x m )).
Given these de…nitions, we establish the three following Lemmas.
Lemma B.4.1 If cities m and j are paired, then P m = P j .
Proof. Consider 2 paired cities m and j being clockwisely paired. By applying Lemma 1 at the centres of cities m and j, we have that P + (x m ) = P (x m ) and P + (x j ) = P (x j ).
This necessarily implies that P m = P j .
Lemma B.4.2 Under neighborhood symmetry, P m = P , 8m.
Proof. First we show by contradiction that under neighborhood symmetry, each city can be clockwisely and counterclockwisely paired. Assume that some city m can't be paired. By assumption it has (M 1)=2 right-and left-neighbors (i.e. #I + m = #I m ). If it can't be paired, then there is a city, say city h, in the interval (x m ; x j+1=2 ) or in the interval (x j+1=2 ; x m ), as described in the pairing construction. This implies that #I , P m = P m+
, meaning that P m = P , 8m.
Lemma B.4.3 Neighborhood symmetry holds.
Proof. We show that if neighborhood symmetry didn't hold, then there would be a city with a negative population.
Step 1. We show that if neighborhood symmetry does not hold, then there exists some city m that can't be paired clockwisely. By assumption, there is some city m for which the numbers of right-and left-neighbors are di¤erent (i.e. #I This number is necessarily even. Even when accounting for the clockwise pairing of city m, there will always remain at least a city that can't be paired.
Step 2. Partition cities into cities that can be clockwisely paired and those that cannot be. Consider two successive cities m (that can't be clockwisely paired ) and m + 1 (that can be clockwisely paired). Applying Lemma 1 at the centre of those cities implies that P m + P m+1 = 0 so that the population of some city should be negative. 
Antipodal cities
Even number of cities
